Pitching Promises and Missteps: How the Braves’ Rotation Gamble Backfired
As the 2024 offseason approached, the Atlanta Braves were staring down a future with deep uncertainty in one of the most critical areas of any roster: the starting rotation. Two of their most accomplished and reliable arms — Max Fried and Charlie Morton — were entering free agency. At the same time, ace Spencer Strider was rehabbing from an InternalBrace procedure, a surgery that promised a quicker recovery than traditional Tommy John but still carried unknowns.
The writing was on the wall. The Braves needed reinforcements in their rotation if they were going to maintain their status as perennial contenders. Instead of using the winter to make aggressive moves or even depth additions, President of Baseball Operations Alex Anthopoulos took a passive, high-risk approach — one that now appears to have left Atlanta exposed.
Despite ample opportunities in the free agent market and via trade, Anthopoulos chose to do… virtually nothing. He passed on even modest upgrades. Notably, he declined to tender a $5 million arbitration contract to Griffin Canning — a serviceable arm who went on to post a 3.23 ERA with the New York Mets. That budget-friendly contract would’ve added solid depth to a rotation losing multiple high-profile contributors.
Instead of reinforcing the rotation, Anthopoulos bet on internal development and injury comebacks. The plan? A spring training competition. Ian Anderson — once a postseason hero — was invited to earn his way back after missing significant time. The Braves hoped Strider could seamlessly return from surgery and pick up where he left off. And most surprisingly, Grant Holmes, a 28-year-old journeyman reliever with zero MLB starts entering the season, was penciled in as a replacement for Charlie Morton.
The Internal Optimism That Fueled a Risky Approach
Anthopoulos addressed the decision with a carefully worded defense, focusing on internal potential and continuity:
“We’ve lost free agents, no doubt about it, but we have some people we are going to give opportunities to,” Anthopoulos said. “Strider and Fried are not the same, but we lost Strider for last year, and we had the best ERA in the game. We lost Fried now, but Strider comes back. We lose Charlie Morton — can Grant Holmes take that opportunity and be that guy? We think he’s certainly got a chance to do that.”
At face value, the logic wasn’t entirely irrational. The Braves led all of MLB in ERA during Strider’s absence the previous season. The thought process seemed to be, If we survived without him once, we can do it again with his return. The leap in logic, however, came from assuming that Strider, still recovering from surgery, would immediately return to All-Star form and that Holmes — unproven and aging out of “prospect” status — could hold down a back-end role.
In theory, it could have worked. In practice, it fell apart almost immediately.
Spring Training Realities and Early-Season Shakeups
The first sign that the plan was flawed came during spring training. Ian Anderson, whom the front office hoped could rebound and anchor a spot, struggled significantly. He failed to show any signs of returning to form and didn’t make it to Opening Day. That left a hole that was filled by A.J. Smith-Shawver, a promising rookie who impressed enough to earn a roster spot — though not necessarily because he forced the issue. Rather, it was Anderson’s collapse that opened the door.
Smith-Shawver initially thrived, displaying electric stuff and poise beyond his years. It looked like perhaps the Braves had caught a break. But that promise was short-lived. Smith-Shawver suffered a torn UCL — a devastating blow that not only derailed his rookie campaign but also left the Braves with one fewer rotation option during an already thin period. While injuries can never be predicted, they must be prepared for. And this is where the offseason inactivity came back to bite Atlanta hard.
The loss of Smith-Shawver exposed a fundamental truth: the Braves didn’t have enough depth. Instead of having a plug-and-play fifth starter like Canning, or a swingman ready to absorb innings, the Braves were forced to turn again to internal options that were either untested or underwhelming.
Veteran Fragility and Predictable Pitfalls
Depth wasn’t just a luxury; it was a necessity — especially given the known injury histories of some arms. One such example was Reynaldo López, who was brought in after a successful 2023 season as a reliever but was transitioned into a starting role in 2024. López started the season with promise but was shut down almost immediately after one outing due to shoulder soreness. This wasn’t a fluke. López had a recent history of fatigue issues and short-term injuries, so depending on him for 150+ innings was always a stretch. And yet, the front office seemed caught off guard when he couldn’t stay on the mound.
If the López situation was predictable, then the Holmes experiment was always going to be a gamble. Fortunately for the Braves, that particular roll of the dice has gone better than expected. Holmes has pitched to a 3.78 ERA, solid enough for a fourth or fifth starter, and better than Charlie Morton, who left in free agency to sign with the Orioles. Morton has struggled mightily in Baltimore, carrying a 6.20 ERA, suggesting that letting the veteran go may have been the right call — or at least not a damaging one.
But the larger issue was Anthopoulos’ reliance on Spencer Strider to fill Max Fried’s shoes. That expectation now looks less like strategic optimism and more like a serious miscalculation.
Spencer Strider: From Ace to Question Mark
Coming off a major surgical procedure, Spencer Strider entered 2025 under enormous pressure — both internally and externally. He was expected not just to return but to dominate. The organization essentially built its rotation plan around his return to form, asking him to replace the production of a former Cy Young candidate in Max Fried.
But the results have been sobering.
After another rough outing against the Diamondbacks in which he surrendered five earned runs in five innings — including three home runs — Strider’s season ERA ballooned to 5.68. More concerning than the numbers was the diminished velocity. His fastball, once regularly clocked at 98-99 mph, was sitting around 95 mph. And his control has been erratic at best.
There’s still time for Strider to rediscover his command and velocity, and the InternalBrace procedure does offer hope for a strong, long-term recovery. But right now, he doesn’t look like an ace — and certainly not like Max Fried, who is thriving in his new home.
Fried, now with the New York Yankees, is anchoring their rotation and has firmly entrenched himself in the early Cy Young conversation with a stellar 1.92 ERA. While it’s true that Fried didn’t pitch this well for the Braves in 2024 — he finished with a 3.25 ERA—the comparison still stings. Even at his “worst,” Fried is better than what Strider is currently providing. The gamble, then, wasn’t just risky — it was reckless.
The Consequences of Inaction
In a division as competitive as the NL East, every missed opportunity matters. Anthopoulos’ offseason passivity may not only be limiting the Braves’ potential — it might be actively undermining their postseason chances. The refusal to bring in even average rotation depth left the team overly reliant on health and internal development, both of which have already failed them. Injuries to López and Smith-Shawver, Anderson’s collapse, and Strider’s struggles have left the Braves searching for stability.
The situation isn’t hopeless. There are still games to be played, trade deadlines to approach, and possibilities for players like Strider to rebound. But the decisions (or lack thereof) made in the offseason loom large over this team. Anthopoulos, often praised for his shrewd roster construction and financial discipline, may have finally overplayed his hand.
Replacing Fried with Strider was never a one-for-one proposition — not in talent, not in timing, and certainly not in reliability. Betting on that equivalency was a misjudgment. One that could very well be remembered as the reason the 2025 Braves fell short of their lofty ambitions.
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